organization and the adoption of at least some of the processes of the Occident. Some entered upon these changes with reluctance. Others were enthusiastic. After 1900, however, the structure of China's older culture crumbled and no very important effort was made at resistance. The changes affected every realm of the nation's life—political, economic, intellectual, religious, and social. They have been going on at the same time in each of these realms and any attempt to classify them must be simply for the purpose of clarifying what is at best a confused story. To be true to fact, the record cannot but be bewildering.

To most observers in the Occident, particularly the more casual, the most important changes have appeared to be in domestic politics and in international relations. These have certainly been spectacular, even though eventually they may prove not to have been the most significant of the movements of these decades.

In domestic politics the opening decades of the twentieth century, and particularly the years after 1911, presented a kaleidoscopic picture. In general, until 1926 the record was one of the progressive collapse of central and local government and an increase in civil strife, banditry, and anarchy. The *descensus Averni* was not constant: at times it appeared to have been halted and recovery even seemed to have begun. Until the year 1926, however, each attempt at stabilization proved abortive and was followed by renewed and often intensified disorder.

In general, the causes for the disastrous record were six—the pressure of the Occident and Japan, the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty, the necessity of making radical alterations in the political

structure of the country, corruption, economic distress, and internal dissensions.

The pressure of the Occident and Japan took many forms, but it always increased rather than abated. It made inevitable profound changes in all phases of China's culture, including, of course, government.

The collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty deprived China of its best chance of going through the inescapable transformation without ihaos. Although the structure of the Chinese state left a great deal to local initiative, much depended on the Emperor. We have seen that again and again through the centuries, when that office was incompetently filled rebellions wasted the land. When weak-